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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I 
·w. P. HARLIN CONSTRUCTION )' 
COl\iPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
1Case No. 
vs. j 10773 
UTAH STATE ROAD COMMIS-
SION ' Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIE~ 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PRE - TRIAL HEARING WAS NOT 
A SUl\ilHARY JUDGl\IENT PROCEEDING. 
In Respondent's Point I, it contends that the 
Pre-Trial Court's holding on the First Cause of Action 
Was proper because :Motions for Summary Judgment 
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and attached Affidavits had been filed by both sides. 
Respondent is incorrect. The hearing was not a sum-
mary judgment proceeding, but as indicated on the 
Pre-Trial Order, was a Pre-Trial hearing. (R. 70). 
The Pre-trial Court's order would be equally erro-
neous if this had been a Summary Judgment pro-
ceeding since there were several factual disputes vital 
to a determination of the issues which were not even 
considered by the Court, or which could not have been 
decided as a matter of law, in the absence of consider-
able evidence, to-wit: the areas of Waiver, Estoppel, 
Arbitrariness, The State's prior agreement, and Breach 
of Contract. 
POINT II 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS AVAILABLE 
AGAINST THE STATE. 
At page 8 of its brief, Respondent contends that 
the Doctrine of Estoppel will not be applied against 
the State in the performance of its governmental func· 
tions. This contention is without merit in our case. 
"Governmental functions" and "proprietary func· 
tions" are distinguished in cases involving the question 
of Governmental immunity against suit; and a State 
in performing these "governmental functions" is gen· 
erally immune from suit in the absence of a statute 
to the contrary. 
Under the specific holding of Niblock v. Salt Lake 
City, 100 Utah 573, Ill P 2d 800, and under the com· 
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plete definition of "governmental function" established 
in Cobia v. Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375, 366 P 2d 986, 
the State would probably be immune from suits involv-
ing the construction of highways - a governmental 
function-in the absence of our statute. Of course, 
Utah does have a statute waiving this immunity. See 
Section 27-12-9 U.C.A., as amended and Section 63-
.30-5 U.C.A., as amended in 1965, which later section 
provides: "Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived as to any contractual obligation." 
Therefore since governmental immunity is waived, it 
cannot be used as a bar to estoppel, as Respondent 
here attempts to do. 
Respondent's cases cited at pages 8 and 9 are 
clearly not in point, but rather involve either the ques-
tion of the delegation of functions to various State 
' highway departments, or situations where the person 
against whom estoppel is being asserted had no author-
ity to represent the State. Obviously, our case is ma-
terially different and can be summarized as follows: 
1. The State waived immunity by statute. 
2. The State entered into the construction con-
tract. ( R. 1, 9) . 
3. The contract authorized the Chief Structural 
Engineer for the State to agree on the rating of the 
hammer ( R. 9), without the necessity of any writing. 
4. Estoppel would lie against the State or the 
Engineer to deny such an agreement. 
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Respondent cites 1 A.L.R. 2d 347 as authority 
that estoppel will not lie against the State. However, 
that citation does not support respondent's contention, 
and as a matter of fact, the rule is well established in 
this annotation that a State may be estopped when the 
acts of its officials, alleged to constitute the grounds 
of estoppel, are done in the exercise of powers expressly 
conferred by law and when acting within the scope 
of their authority. 28 Am. Jur. 2d 786. Such is our case. 
Respondent now raises on appeal and for the first 
time in the case a question as to the authority of the 
State to agree to the use of the D-12 Hammer on the 
prior 21st South project. Such an argument at this 
time is surprising indeed in view of the record in which 
the State clearly admits that the use of the D-12 Ham-
mer was permitted on the 21st South project. It must 
follow that if the State permitted the use, that the 
rating was acceptable and agreed to. 
In its Answer, (R. 17) respondent admitted the 
first three paragraphs of the plaintiff's Amended Com· 
plaint. The Amended Complaint is set forth at Pages 
9 through 12 of the record, and the original Complaint 
at Pages 1 through 6. At Paragraph 4 of the Answer 
appears the following admission by respondent: 
"Defendant admits that the specifications for 
a pile driver on the 21st overpass contract wer~ 
the same as those on the present contract ... 
At Page 28 of the record is plaintiff's Interroga-
tory No. 6, which asks: 
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"State whether or not the defendant permitted 
the use of the plaintiff's Del Mag D-12 Ham-
mer on the 21st South project, and give the name 
of the Project Engineer for the State who per-
mitted the use of said hammer." 
At Page 143 of the record is the defendant's 
answer: 
"The State did not specifically agree to an 
energy rating for the Contractor's Del Mag 
D-1~ Hammer used on the 21st South project, 
but did not question its use. The State's Project 
Engineer on this work was Maurice Anderson. 
Tolboe & Harlin Construction Company was 
the Contractor." 
See also paragraph 2 of the affadivit of William 
P. Harlin (R. 53): 
"That the defendant agreed to and had estab-
lished a rating on the plaintiff's diesel hammer 
prior to use on the subject project, and has 
since agreed to its use and rating on similar jobs 
in Salt Lake Valley on the same Interstate 
Project with the sani.e plans and specifications." 
Respondent, at page 11 of its brief, quotes only a 
portion of the Appellant's Answer to the Respond-
ent's Interrogatory No. l, and thus argues that Ap-
pellant has conclusively admitted a lack of authority 
on the part of the State's employees to accept the prior 
use of the Del Mag Hammer on the 21st South job. 
However, the complete Answer should be noted, since 
in its completeness, Appellant states 
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"The acceptance was oral and occurred br 
reason of the fact that the defendant was i11._ 
formed of the use of the Del ~lag D-12 Ham-
mer and the defendant permitted said use for the 
entire pile driving portion of said project ... " 
This Interrogatory, however, only refers to the 
term acceptance used in Paragraph 4 of the Amended 
Complaint ( R. I 0) . The balance of the allegations 
of that Paragraph 4 clearly establish the basis for the 
prior agreement as to the rating of the Del Mag D-12 
Hammer. 
Assuming, for purposes of argument that there 
is a question as to whether or not the Project Engineer 
had authority to act for the Chief Structural Engineer 
in making the agreement as to the use of the Hammer, 
such a question must be developed as a factual ques-
tion, not as a conclusive legal admission, as is claimed 
by Respondent. 
The foregoing clearly indicates that Appellant's 
claim of estoppel and its claim that the State had 
agreed to the rating are legally sound. The facts from , 
respondent's most optimistic viewpoint are in contra· 
versy. The matter should have been tried and not sum· 
marily dismissed as a matter of law. 
POINT III 
BAD FAITH IS NOT A NECESSARY ELE· 
MENT FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT UY 
THE STATE. 
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Respondent, beginning at page 15 of its brief, 
argues exclusively that since Appellant admitted there 
was no bad faith on the part of the Chief Structural 
Engineer, there can be no recovery for breach of con-
, tract. This argument is untenable for the fallowing 
reasons: 
I. The Interrogatory in question only states: 
(R. 147) 
Attached to these Interrogatories marked Ex-
hibit "A" is a copy of a report made by David 
L. Sargent concerning these tests. Does plain-
tiff contend that this report of David L. Sargent 
was made in bad faith? 
The Answer-No. 
Obviously there is no report attached to the Inter-
rogatories, but we assume that it is the same report as 
is attached to the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
as pages 50-a, b of the Record. Just as clearly, the 
report is undated but is subsequent to the action com-
plained of. The arbitrary testing and rejection of 
the Hammer, as well as the report, are here involved. 
All of the circumstances must be considered in deter-
mining the answer to the problem-not just the making 
of the report. 
2. Admitting, for purposes of argument, that the 
Engineer did not act in bad faith, Appellant claims 
a breach of contract as a matter of law when the State 
rrfuses to allow the specifications which prescribe the 
lest for approval of the D-12 Hammer. 
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3. Lack of bad faith does not imply that the actions 
of the State were not arbitrary. Arbitrariness and bad 
faith are not used synonymously in cases of breach of 
contract. Even Respondent's cases distinguish between 
the two concepts, so that the absence of bad faith does 
not mean the lack of arbitrariness. 
Bad faith as such is a subjective thing imparting 
a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity. It evi-
dences an "actual intent to mislead or deceive." Spi,egel 
vs. Beacon Participations, 8 N.E. 2d 895. In this case, 
the court defines "bad faith" as a mere actual state of 
mind-not a technical term. Dishonesty and fraud 
are synonymous with bad faith. Pabst Brewing Com-
pany vs. Nelson, 236 P. 873. 
Arbitrariness on the other hand is the exercise of 
discretion in such a manner after a consideration of 
evidence, as clearly to indicate an action is based on 
conclusions, such that reasonable men fairly and hon· 
estly considering the evidence would reach contrary 
conclusions. Greer vs. Susman, (Colo.) 298 P. 2d 948. 
See also Miller vs. City of Tacoma, 378 P. 2d 464, 474. 
This concept is better stated in Robertson vs. Cameron, 
224 Fed. Supp. 60, 62. The Court holds that to bf 
arbitrary or capricious, one must be without a reason· 
sonable or rational basis, but one need not act in bad 
faith. 
" ... By arbitrary or capricious is not meant 
that the refusal must be in bad faith. These 
words are not used in their popular opprobious 
significance. They are words of art and they 
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mean merely that there must be a reasonable or 
rational basis for the action of the superintend-
ent. The superintendent may not act according 
to his personal notion or whim no matter how 
well intended or bona fide his action may be." 
It is no excuse that the Structural Engineer may 
have exercised his honest judgment. His actions on 
behalf of the State are still arbitrary even though he 
misconstrues his duties so that he can honestly say that 
he was not acting in bad faith. His bad faith is a sub-
jective criteria, but it does not extend to an objective 
consideration of his actions and the actions of the State 
in arbitrarily ref using to follow the specifications, and 
in clearly breaching the contract by wrongfully reject-
ing the hammer for reasons not set forth in the speci-
fications. 
Furthermore, the alleged reasons were not proven 
to be in any way indicative of the ability of the ham-
mer to perform the contract. Such other reasons, if 
they were valid under the contract specifications, should 
have been subjected to proof, in view of the contention 
of Appellant that the hammer did have the proper 
raliug and could, if it had been permitted to function, 
comply with all aspects of the specifications. Again, 
we have a substantial factual issue, even taking the 
State's most extreme position, that it had authority 
to reject the hammer on some basis other than the 
failure to agree upon a rating. Certainly the Pre-Trial 
Court completely disregarded the other breach of con-
tract issues by holding as a matter of law that Appel-
lant couldn't recover. (R. 71). 
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POINT IV. 
APPELLANT'S AN S WE R TO INTER 
ROGATORY NO. 3 IS NOT CONCLUSIVE. 
Respondent, at Page 19, falls back upon the untrue 
statement that "the admitted fact that nothing was 
done by Appellant at that time," destroys Appellant's 
allegation of arbitrary action. Such a narrow concept 
of the interrogatory is unwarranted. Respondent 
argues on the one hand that Appellant is held to an 
admission "at that particular time" (R. 45) (Answer 
3), and then on the other hand at Page 18 of its brief: 
"The issues to whether Respondent's Chief 
Structural Engineer acted arbitrarily must be 
examined not only in light of the Chief Struc· 
tural Engineer's knowledge and expertise, but 
also in light of the total circumstances that sur· 
round the rejection of Appellant's combustion-
type hammer." 
What difference does it make that Appellant at the 
test was not sufficiently clairvoyant to fully advise the 
State as to all possible reasons why the test was arbi-
trary. Suppose Appellant had not discovered how 
arbitrary the rejection really was for months - does 
this lessen the arbitrariness? Must a man discover 
fraud at its inception, or all of the facts of arbitrariness 
as they occur? 
Prior to the test the State was informed of the only 
facts then available. Only as the test began and as the 
methods and conclusions were made apparent by the 
State, did the full scope of the irrelevance and capri· 
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cious nature of the test become known to the Con-
tractor. Then, of course, he registered further objec-
tions, but all to no avail. 
The arbitrary nature of the State's action was 
implicit in its deliberate disregard of the energy rating, 
and its avowed purpose, not to be concerned with that 
rating. Therefore what else could the Contractor do, 
either as a matter of fact, or of law, than what it did 
I do: 
i ! 
a. After the State and the Contractor had 
entered into the contract, the State on June 3, for 
the first time, questioned the manufacturer's rating. 
of 22,500-foot pounds. (R. 74). 
b. The Contractor asked for a short delay to 
obtain further information in support of the manu-
facturer's rating, ( R. 7 4) and on June 7 in a 
meeting with the State, the Contractor and its 
Consulting Engineer further gave the State in-
formation to support the 22,500 rating, and that 
this size and type of hammer was being used 
throughout the Western states on Interstate 
Highway projects. (R. 76). 
c~ On June 10, the Contractor and the special 
engineer met with the State and raised various 
questions concerning the forthcoming test. (R. 
77, and letter dated June 13, 1963, following page 
81 of the Record). 
d. The test was conducted in an arbitrary and 
irrelevant manner, in that it did not prove any 
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rating at all, the capability and rating of the com. 
petitor's hammer was unknown, the tests were 
merely to see which hammer could drive through 
a dense layer and established nothing by way of 
rating or compliance with the specifications, every-
one present saw that the tests were inaccurate, 
speculative and immaterial, (R. 44, 45, 50-a, 50-b, 
53, 54, 55) and that the tests were conducted by 
the State deliberately avoiding a determination 
of the energy rating of Appellant's hammer. 
The State was intent upon rejecting the hammer 
for a fallacious and unsupported reason, to-wit, that 
the competitor's hammer was larger and was undoubt-
edly going to be able to drive through a dense layer 
of material much more easily than could the combus-
tion-type hammer. That layer was below the contract· 
required depth and far below the depth to which the 
piles were ultimately driven on this project. The test 
had absolutely no bearing on the rating nor on the 
ability of the D-12 to comply with the specifications. 
POINT V 
A DD IT I 0 N AL ARGUMENTS WERE 
SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION A1 
THE TIME OF TRIAL. 
It is clear from an examination of the recor1 
that additional arguments were presented at the tirn 
of trial, which even more clearly indicated the inequit: 
and the legal error, together with the manifest injustic 
resulting from the failure to include the First Caus 
12 
of Action in the trial of the law suit. Respondent's 
Point III is not supported by the record. (R. 73-85, 
VO, 91). 
SUMMARY 
Respondent seems to have presented nothing to 
support the lower court's ruling, other than Respond-
ent's version of the controverted facts. Why the trial 
court relied upon an incomplete excerpt from the 
Answers to interrogatories to rule as a matter of law 
that Appellant could not recover on its First Cause 
of action, and why Appellant should be precluded from 
trying this cause of action because at the testing it 
didn't inform the State of all of the facts going to 
make up the arbitrary action by the State, when it 
didn't know all of the facts, are still unanswered by 
Respondent. It should not be necessary for the Re-
spondent to rely upon an array of facts at this point 
in our procedure. If such reliance is necessary, then 
we should have had a trial of the issues. Both Appellant 
and Respondent argue that many facts must be con-
sidered and yet the trial court decided as a matter of 
law that no facts need be considered. Such a ruling 
is an abuse of the trial court's discretion and is un-
supported by any theory of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT 
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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